USJFCOMLive

I think this center has great potential synergy with a regional initiative that HRMFFA has spearheaded to establish a DoD Robotics Technology Training Center for First Responders in Hampton Roads at Camp Pendleton. Both Senator Webb and Rep Nye have submitted appropriations requests in this year’s Defense budget.
It would be great to explore what the synergy might be between this JFCOM effort and the future First responder training center.
Regards,
Frank Roberts
Executive Director
hampton Roads Military &
Federal Facilities Alliance (HRMFFA)
757-644-6324

A great article illustrating some of the best and most progressive thought of the day… directed towards some of our most urgent needs, day after day, year after year.

Challenges are many (speaking in terms of .civ) with 30k fire departments (independent empires) and probably another 20k police depts (independent empires); many in the same political jurisdiction far from being integrated…in many respects.

So much more in terms of joint/unified ops is required for many of the hazards/risks faced…from the basics (a common ops grid) and beyond.

Towards that end, I can imagine much good coming from “a national center for small unit excellence” and other efforts as outlined by MG Kamiya. So many opportunities exist to benefit both our military and fire/LE/public works/non-profits, etc.

MG Honore’ had a list of I think ten “quick fixes” in his post-Katrina testimony to the US Senate (http://www.emergencymanagement.org/#m), and his #1: “Establish pre-event unified Command and Control (C2) organizational structure.” On the .civ side of the house we have a very long ways to go and our worst enemy is that so many believe that “NIMS” and being able to yammer on a radio when you want…alone makes unified C2 a given, nothing else is needed.

Promising new leadership at FEMA and more…, combined with excellence in USJFCOM as illustrated by the “new triad” efforts being extended to our first (secondary/tertiary) responders…, things are looking up in my opinion.

Thanks for the article.

Measuring how effective new tools are in terms of use in small units should be studied before such tools are even completely prototyped using mock-ups of the intended tools that actually do what the real tools intend to do albeit using smoke and mirrors to achieve
it instead of the actual backing technology. For example, if some new proposed tool is to give some new form of information to a
small unit to help in some way, then just literally give test units the info in simulations or training scenarios, literally hand them the data and measure how it affects performance when present or not before a dime is spent on the real tool.

With regard to the statement:
“The ultimate goal is to provide the individual, leader, and small unit with a training capability that
makes their last contact with the enemy no worse than the last simulation.”
I find disturbing because simulations are based on models of reality. Those models will
always contain assumptions that may or may not apply to all situations. Furthermore, with the kinds of np-hard problems associated with networks, even small ones, of interacting interdependent actors at some point must employ the use of statistics and probabilities to make the problem tractable or computable in practical time. again the model must be bent.

Finally, these proposed types of studies may yield answers that command structures may not want to face. For example, what if it is found
that it is better for small unit performance if they do NOT know everything, if they do not have complete situational awareness. What if
they perform better when kept in the dark about certain information. Will you simulate that? What if some scenario would yield the
best results if one small unit sacrificed itself for the good of the larger unit, will you simulate that?

I am all for simulation and modeling as long as such is made as adaptive as possible and as long as the full range of possible
results are presented, not distillations or reductions that deny the complexity of the data involved.

Sir,
General Kamiya is taking JFCOM in the right direction with the Triad Concept. JFCOM, however, has been missing a major component of science and engineering knowledge since its inception and would thus have difficulty supporting General Kamiya and his Vision. New ventures addressing the development, training, and validation of the Triad Concepts will be extremely difficult because there is a severe short fall of advanced knowledge and information processing science whose developments has been allowed to lag.

The Global problems faced by the Triad Concept now demands advanced knowledge in Critical Thinking, Logic, the Art of Reasoning, newly defined Tripartitie Reasoning Mind, and an expanded Scientific Philosophy to provide the foundational basis. This knowledge exists and is fully developed but has been ignored for 110 years.

A better understanding of Auftragstaktiks will become clearer when studied under this new advanced knowledge. Auftragstaktik will be a crucial element in the success of the Triad Small Unit Concepts.

Future Global weapons system design and intellignce analyses will be improved with the new knowledge. The present scientific paradigm has reached a dead-end and is increasingly failing to produce new innovative and advanced scientific ideas. Adherence to obsolete philosophies will lead to defeat in combat.

The Global Threat is devoid of these self-imposed scientific and engineering impediments and they have begun to leap frog our ability to think and act quickly. Our continued adherence to the OODA Loop needs to modified to take advantage of the team-oriented Deming/Shewhart Cycle and Peirce Self-Correcting Cycle that preceded the “fighter pilot” model of the OODA Loop.

Thank you.
Very respectfully,
Ed Nozawa
Operations Research Analyst